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In Breaux v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,' the Loui-
siana Supreme Court had to decide for the first time whether a claim-
ant could recover under both the liability and the uninsured
motorist provisions of the same automobile insurance policy. The
plaintiffs were the survivors of a passenger in the insured vehicle
who was killed in an accident caused by the negligence of the
operator of that vehicle. They entered into a settlement with
GEICO, the insurer of the host driver's vehicle, for the amount
which represented their proportionate share of the liability limits.
However, they expressly released all claims against GEICO under
both the liability and the uninsured motorist provisions of its
policy.2 Since the value of their claim exceeded the amount of the
settlement, the plaintiffs sought to recover the remainder of their
damages from Traders, their own uninsured motorist carrier.'
Traders denied responsibility on the ground that GEICO would have
provided the primary uninsured motorist coverage if it had not been
released by the plaintiffs.' Therefore, Traders claimed that it was
entitled to credit for the amount of GEICO's uninsured motorist
coverage, which coverage would have been sufficient to fully com-
pensate the plaintiffs without resort to Trader's policy.5
The First Circuit Court of Appeal6 agreed with Traders, thus in-
directly holding that a claimant was able to recover under both the
*Special Lecturer of Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge Bar.
1. 369 So. 2d 1335 (La. 1979).
2. The liability limits were $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. The
policy afforded uninsured motorist coverage with the same limits. Since there were
multiple injuries and deaths, the full liability limits were not available to plaintiffs who
settled for $39,700. The trial court concluded that their total damages were $76,904.65,
leaving a claim of $37,204.65 in excess of the liability limits. Id at 1336-37.
3. Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(2)(b) extends the definition of an uninsured motor
vehicle to include an underinsured vehicle where liability coverage is less than the
amount of damages suffered by the insured.
4. The "other insurance" clauses of uninsured motorist coverage generally pro-
vide that the coverage is excess when the insured is occupying a nonowned automobile
covered by similar insurance.
5. See note 2, supra. Traders argued that the plaintiffs would have received the
same proportion of the uninsured motorist limits as liability limits, $39,700.
6. 364 So. 2d 158 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
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liability and the uninsured motorist provisions of the same policy for
damages caused by the negligence of the host driver. The court
followed the logic of the third circuit in Guillot v. Travelers Indem-
nity Co.,7 Which held that the policy provisions designed to prevent
such multiple recovery were invalid because they were in deroga-
tion of the uninsured motorist coverage required by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 22:1406(D).8
A unanimous supreme court reversed. In the opinion by Justice
Marcus analyzing Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D), the
supreme court concluded that the statute implicitly distinguished
between an "insured vehicle" and an "uninsured vehicle" and did
not contemplate that a single vehicle could be both the insured and
the uninsured vehicle. The court thus concluded that the statute
does not require that the uninsured motorist coverage of a policy be
extended to occupants of the insured automobile after they have ex-
hausted the liability coverage for the negligent host driver under
that policy, with the result that policy provisions which preclude
such multiple coverage were enforceable. Since the GEICO unin-
sured motorist coverage was not available to the plaintiffs, Traders
was liable under its uninsured motorist coverage for their damages
in excess of the liability coverage up to the limits of the Traders
policy. Although this decision worked to the benefit of the plaintiffs
in the Breaux case, the net effect will be to restrict the amount of
uninsured motorist coverage available to guest passengers."
However, the decision is certainly consistent with the express provi-
sions of the insurance policy and based upon a reasonable inter-
pretation of the statute."
7. 338 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
8. In uninsured motorist coverage, the insured is entitled to receive from his
own insurer the damages he is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
"uninsured highway vehicle." Policies generally provide that an uninsured highway
vehicle shall not include "an insured automobile or an automobile furnished or
available for the regular use of the named insured or any relative."
9. Although a recent amendment generally restricts recovery to the limits of one
uninsured policy, 1977 La. Acts, No. 623, amending LA. R.S. 22:1406(D) (Supp. 1962 &
1975), the statute does permit "stacking" of two policies where the insured is occupy-
ing an automobile not owned by him. Therefore, if Breaux had permitted recovery
under the policy on the vehicle, the passenger also would have been able to stack his
own policy if needed to compensate for his damages.
10. Under a different factual situation, there remains a possibility of both
coverages being available under the same policy. Suppose the passenger were injured
through the joint negligence of his host driver and another motorist who was not in-
sured. If the liability limits of the host driver were inadequate, could the passenger
look to the uninsured motorist coverage on the host vehicle based upon the liability of
the other motorist? In this situation, the exclusion of the "insured vehicle" from the
definition of "uninsured motor vehicle," see note 8, supra, would not preclude coverage
1980]
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In Niemann v. Travelers Insurance Co.," a sharply divided Loui-
siana Supreme Court devastated the "subrogation" rights of the in-
surer under uninsured motorist coverage. Auto policies generally
provide for Subrogation upon payment of the uninsured motorist
claim to the insured's rights against the negligent motorist and pro-
tect the subrogation right with both a general obligation not to prej-
udice such right and a specific obligation not to settle with the
negligent motorist without consent of the insurer.2 In Niemann, the
insured settled with the insurer of the negligent motorist for an
amount nearly equal to the limits of his liability coverage. He ex-
pressly released both the negligent motorist and his insurer without
seeking the consent of his own insurer. When the insured, claiming
that he had not been fully compensated for his damages, then made
demand upon his own insurer under the uninsured motorist provi-
sions of his policy, this insurer defended on the ground that the in-
sured had breached the subrogation and consent-to-settle provisions
of the policy. Reversing the lower courts, the supreme court held
that these provisions were not enforceable because the insurer was
since there was another uninsured vehicle to trigger coverage. However, policies seek
to prevent such multiple recovery under the liability and uninsured motorist provi-
sions of the same policy by providing that the insurer is entitled to dollar for dollar
credit against the limits of liability of one coverage for any amount payable under the
other coverage. Decisions such as Crenwelge v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co., 277 So. 2d 155 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973), cast doubt as to whether such
credit provisions would be enforceable against the argument that such provisions
reduce the coverage below the mandatory limits required by statute.
11. 368 So. 2d 1003 (La. 1979). Justice Calogero authored the majority opinion.
Chief Justice Summers and Justices Marcus and Culpepper (ad hoc) dissented.
12. In Niemann, the policy provided as follows:
"30. Subrogation Parts I, II, III [Protection Against Uninsured Motorists]
and V
"In the event of any payment under this policy, the company shall be
subrogated to all the insured's rights of recovery therefor against any person or
organization and, with respect to Part II, all the rights of recovery therefor which
the injured person or any one receiving such payment may have against any per-
son or organization. The insured, or with respect to Part II such person, shall ex-
ecute and deliver instruments and papers, do whatever else is necessary to secure
such rights and shall do nothing for loss to prejudice such rights.
"Part III-Protection Against Uninsured Motorists
"Exclusions
"This policy does not apply under Part III:
"(b) to bodily injury to an insured with respect to which such insured, his
legal representative or any person entitled to payment under this coverage shall
without written consent of the company, make any settlement with any person or
organization who may be legally liable therefor.
Id. at 1005.
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vested only with a limited right of reimbursement under the provi-
sions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(4) 3 and had no right
to control the insured's settlement with the negligent motorist or
his insurer. In justifying this extremely narrow reading of the
statute, the majority pointed to the insured's dilemma in underin-
sured motorist situations. The liability insurer of the negligent
motorist will generally require the insured to release both before it
will voluntarily settle for its policy limits." On the other hand, the
insured's own uninsured motorist carrier would refuse consent to
such settlement in many instances to preserve its subrogation claim
against the negligent motorist, thus for its own self-interest prevent-
ing its insured from receiving early compensation. However, the
decision appears to leave the uninsured motorist carrier completely
at the mercy of its own insured without an enforceable right to
place the ultimate burden of the loss on the negligent motorist. In
addition, the path is open for collusion between the insured and the
negligent motorist."
The Niemann opinion recommends legislative clarification of the
statute, and this is a wise suggestion. The uncertainty which spawned
Breaux, Niemann, and much other uninsured motorist litigation
results from legislative and jurisprudential tinkering with specific
aspects of the coverage, without a coordinated approach to the en-
tire coverage. The concept has developed dramatically since its in-
ception in 1962 into an extremely important protection for motorists
in Louisiana. The legislature should undertake a complete revision
of the existing statute in order to coordinate the legislative amend-
ments, clarify the uncertainties, eliminate the need for so much in-
terpretative litigation, and speed the compensation of accident vic-
tims.
13. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(4) (Supp. 1975 & 1977) provides:
In the event of payment to any person under the coverage required by this
Section and subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, the insurer
making such payment shall, to the extent thereof, be entitled to the proceeds of
any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery
of such person against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily
injury for which such payment is made, including the proceeds recoverable from
the assets of the insolvent insurer.
14. The insurer will wish not only to protect its insured from liability in excess of
the liability policy limits but also to relieve itself of any further obligation to defend its
insured.
15. The legislature should seek a compromise between the interests of the insured
and his insurer. For example, the right of an uninsured motorist carrier to disapprove
a settlement by its insured with the liability insurer and the negligent motorist could
be conditioned upon the requirement that the carrier advance the amount of the pro-
posed settlement to its insured pending final resolution of the liability claim.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
FIRE POLICIES
In Rodriguez v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 6 the in-
surer sought to defeat liability under its fire insurance coverage on
a log skidder on the ground that the insured had breached prom-
issory warranties which required the insured to have a certain type
of fire extinguisher available at all times and to carry out certain
maintenance operations "at frequent intervals" and "before discontin-
uing work for the day." The evidence showed that the equipment
was supplied with a fire extinguisher which differed from the type
required by the policy and that the insured performed the
maintenance at the beginning of each day and at irregular intervals
thereafter depending upon working conditions.
The insured sought to escape the alleged breaches of warranty
on the ground that the insurer had failed to show any causal connec-
tion between the breaches and the fire which damaged the equip-
ment. The court correctly held that the effect of the warranty provi-
sions was governed by Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:692,17 an "anti-
technical" statute which provides that a breach of any representa-
tion, warranty, or condition shall not defeat coverage unless such
breach exists at the time of the loss and increases either the moral
or physical hazard under the policy. The insurer is not required to
show a causal connection between the breach and the loss. However,
the insurer has the burden of proof that (1) there was a breach of
warranty, (2) that the breach materially or substantially increased
the moral or physical hazard under the policy, and (3) that both the
breach and the increase in hazard existed at the time of the loss.
The court concluded that the insurer in Rodriguez had not carried
its burden of proof because it failed to establish that the fire ex-
tinguisher supplied with the equipment differed materially from
that required under the policy or that the variation between the ac-
tual and required maintenance procedures materially increased the
physical hazard."6
16. 358 So. 2d 1237 (La. 1978).
17. LA. R.S. 22:692 (1950) provides in pertinent part:
No policy of fire insurance issued by any insurer on property in this state
shall hereafter be declared void by the insurer for the breach of any representa-
tion, warranty or condition contained in the said policy or in the application
therefor. Such breach shall not avail the insurer to avoid liability unless such
breach (1) shall exist at the time of the loss, and be either such a breach as would
increase either the moral or physical hazard under the policy . . . .
18. Revised Statutes 22:619 is the anti-technical statute applicable to coverages
other than fire coverages.
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